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NOTES 
Enforceability of Religious Law in Secular Courts-
It's Kosher, But Is It Constitutional? 
In several different contexts-for example, in enforcing contracts 
that refer to religious law or in enforcing secular laws that use re-
ligious terminology-secular courts may be called upon to apply and 
even to interpret laws established by religious bodies. The limita-
tions imposed by the first amendment on the courts in these areas 
will be discussed here in the specific context of Judaism. It is the 
thesis of this Note that the courts may not be as constrained in en-
forcing laws of religious bodies and in resolving disputes about those 
laws as would appear at first glance. 
In Wenerv. Wener,1 a New York court faced this problem in de-
ciding whether to award child support payments in a divorce pro-
ceeding between a husband and wife who had been married in an 
Orthodox Jewish ceremony. In accordance with Jewish tradition, at 
the time of the marriage the couple had signed an agreement called 
a ketuba, which provided, among other things, that they were "be-
trothed according to the Laws of Moses and Israel" and that the 
husband assumed all obligations "as are prescribed by our religious 
statutes."2 The ketuba, which was also signed by the officiating rabbi 
and two other witnesses, was written in Hebrew, Aramaic, and 
English.8 
When Mr. and Mrs. Wener later decided to adopt a child, Mrs. 
Wener went to Florida and returned with a female infant, who was 
I. 59 Misc. 2d 957, l!Ol N.Y.S.2d 237 (Sup. Ct. 1969), afjd., 35 App. Div. 2d 50, 312 
N.Y.S.2d 815 (1970). 
2. 59 Misc. 2d at 959, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 240. The phrase "the Laws of Moses and Israel" 
refers to the laws of the Jewish people (not to the modern state of Israel). As the ketuba 
itself docs not list the specific obligations of a husband to his wife, the extent of the hus-
band's obligations can only be determined by reference to that law. There is no single 
codification of Jewish law. The Shulhan Arokh (completed by Joseph Caro in 1542) is 
the most authoritative code of Jewish law, see 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 1475 (1971), but 
it is not the last word. Moses Isserles added several notes recording his differences with 
Caro's work. See 5 id. at 650-51. The other major compilation is the code of Maimonides 
(compiled IISO), which differs in many conclusions of law from the Shulhan Arokh. 
See 5 id. at 638-42. Each of these works relies heavily on the Babylonian and Palestinian 
Talmuds, see 5 id. at 755, which may have to be consulted for a fuller understanding 
of the codified law. Further, all of the above works are heavily annotated with com-
mentaries and, in several cases, commentaries on the commentaries. In addition, there 
exists an extensive Responsa literatur-responses by rabbis to particular legal ques-
tions-that goes back to Talmudic times. See 5 id. at 633. In back of all this stand the 
Five Books of Moses, which are said to contain 613 commandments. See 5 id. at 760. 
3. 59 Misc. 2d at 959, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 240. Traditionally the ketuba is signed just 
before the Jewish wedding service. However, Reform Jews generally oinit the ketuba. 
Finkelstein, The Jewish Religion: Its Beliefs and Practices, in 2 THE JEWs: THEIR 
HisroRY, CULTURE, AND RELIGION 1739, 1789-90 (3d ed. L Finkelstein 1960). 
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never adopted4 but lived with the couple for thirteen months, until 
the husband and wife separated. It was this child for whom the wife 
requested child support. 
The court granted her request on two alternative grounds. First, 
it found an agreement to adopt, which created an obligation of the 
husband to support the child.5 This finding was based on, among 
other things, the husband's cooperation in making arrangements for 
his wife's trip, his supplying the child with the necessities of life 
after the wife's return, his naming the baby girl after his grand-
mother in a ceremony in a synagogue, and his reference to the child 
as his "darling daughter."6 
Second, the trial court found that, even absent an agreement to 
adopt, the marriage contract bound the husband to support the child 
because the Jewish law to which it referred requires that a head of a 
household who takes in a child provide for its support.7 In arriving 
at this conclusion, the court referred extensively to Jewish legal 
sources.8 
The appellate division affirmed only on the first ground, hold-
ing that the husband's support obligation rested upon an implied 
contract and equitable estoppel.9 However, it disapproved of the 
lower tribunal's reliance, in its alternative holding, on Jewish law: 
New York cannot apply one law to its Jewish residents and an-
other law to all others. If our law does not require a husband to 
support a child whom he has never agreed to adopt, the court cannot 
refuse to apply such law because the tenets of the parties' religion 
dictate otherwise. Application of religious law would raise grave 
constitutional problems of equal protection and separation of church 
and state.10 
4. 59 Misc. 2d at 959, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 239-40. 
5. 59 Misc. 2d at 959, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 239. 
6. 59 Misc. 2d at 959, 961, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 239, 241. He also claimed the child as a 
dependent on his federal income tax return under the category "children" and sent 
the child a card signed "Love, Dad." 35 App. Div. 2d at 52, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 817. 
7. 59 Misc. 2d at 959-60, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 240. 
8. 59 Misc. 2d at 960-61, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 240-42. 
9. 35 App. Div. 2d at 53, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 818. 
10. 35 App. Div. 2d at 54, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 819. The appellate court relied on two 
law review notes. 35 App. Div. 2d at 54, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 819. One of these commenta• 
tors said: "The court's reliance on the fact that the parties involved were of a par• 
ticular faith and entitled to special treatment and the application of law particular to 
only people of that faith, appears to be a violation of the equal protection clause of 
the United States Constitution." Note, Domestic Relations-Child Support-Ketuba as 
Grounds for Child Support Claim Notwithstanding Lack of Formal Adoption Proceed-
ing, 15 N.Y. L. FORUM 973, 978 (1969). The other stated: "The problem arises from 
the fact that if the parties were not Jewish, Jewish law would not apply •••• The 
result is that New York would be applying one law to Jews and another to all other 
New York citizens .•.• The New York legislature could not require only Jews to sup-
port minor children brought into their homes; and the courts may not accomplish 
this same result." Note, Jewish Law: A Misapplication in New York, 4 ISRAEL L. REv. 
578, 580 (1969). 
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The appellate division's concern for equal protection would be 
warranted if one law were applied to Jews solely because they are 
Jews and another to Gentiles solely because they are not Jews. Such 
a distinction bears no rational relationship to a legitimate state pur-
pose and would violate the fourteenth amendment.11 However, the 
application of Jewish law by the trial court in Wener was predicated 
not upon the parties' religion or race, but upon the marriage contract 
that the parties had voluntarily signed. The court was merely enforc-
ing the contract. There was no indication that a Jew would be re-
quired to enter into such a contract by New York law; nor did the 
trial court rule that a non-Jew who entered into a similar contract 
would not be bound by the substantive provisions referring to Jewish 
law. 
Wener also raises a second, and more complex, issue-whether 
the first amendment prohibits a secular court from enforcing reli-
gious law. The relevant portion of the first amendment provides that 
"[c]ongress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."12 The first amendment has 
been applied, through the fourteenth amendment, to the states and 
thus to the actions of state civil courts.13 It could be argued that en-
forcing Jewish law through the enforcement of the ketuba, as the 
trial court in Wener would have done, violates the constitutional 
prohibition against state "establishment of religion." 
The Supreme Court has defined "establishment," as used in the 
first clause of the first amendment, as "sponsorship, financial support, 
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity."14 Thus, 
it would clearly be improper for the government to create a church.15 
However, the scope of the prohibition found in the establishment 
clause encompasses more than such clear and direct involvement; it 
also forbids action that is merely a "step" in the direction of estab-
lishment of religion.16 In determining what action falls into that 
category, the Supreme Court has interpreted the establishment clause 
to prohibit state action that (1) lacks a secular purpose, (2) has a 
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, or (3) entangles 
the government "excessively" with religion.17 
The trial court in Wener, it should be repeated, merely intended 
to effectuate the parties' contractual promises. Thus, its purpose was 
11. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). 
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
13. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). 
14. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). 
15. Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). 
16. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
17. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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secular. It did not require that Jewish law apply to all Jews, which 
would have had the primary effect of advancing a certain religion, 
but rather enforced the ketuba as a contract. Had Mr. and Mrs. 
Wener, in their marriage contract, made no general reference to 
Jewish law, but instead specifically listed the obligations that they 
intended to assume, including the obligation of the husband to pro-
vide child support during and after the marriage, the appellate court 
would have enforced the specified contractual obligations. It should 
have reached the same result even though the marriage contract used 
a shorthand reference to such obligations "as are prescribed by 
our religious statutes." In using Jewish legal sources to determine 
what those obligations are, the trial court was merely discerning the 
intent of the parties as a question of fact. 
In Hurwitz v. Hurwitz,18 the court acknowledged the contractual 
nature of the ketuba. The plaintiffs sued to eject their stepmother 
from the house in which she was living. As a defense, the stepmother 
pleaded her rights under a ketuba19 that she had made with the plain-
tiffs' father, alleging that it served as an antenuptial property settle-
ment. The appellate division affirmed the trial court's denial of the 
plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling that the trial 
court should be given an opportunity to investigate the circumstances 
surrounding the making of the ketuba.20 While the court recognized 
that it may not enforce religious law per se, it ruled that a ketuba 
could be enforced as a contract21 in so far as_ it is not contrary to 
state law.22 
If the Hurwitz decision were followed in Wener, the ketuba 
would be enforced so long as there was an intent to make a contract. 
The fact that it was signed as part of the marriage ritual might indi-
cate that the parties merely intended to perform a ceremonial act and 
18. 216 App. Div. 362, 215 N.Y.S. 184 (1926). 
19. The agreement was referred to in Hurwitz as a "koshuba," which is a misspell-
ing of "kesubah," a dialectical variant of "ketuba." 
20. 216 App. Div. at 365, 215 N.Y.S. at 187. The ketuba in Hurwitz was \\Titten 
entirely in Hebrew, creating sufficient ambiguity to necessitate a trial to consider the 
circumstances at the time of execution. 
21. 216 App. Div. at 365, 215 N.Y.S. at 187. Compare this distinction between en• 
forcing a contract in which the parties agree to be bound by Jewish law and enforcing 
the Jewish law per se with Professor Paulsen's analysis of adoption statutes that con-
tain a "religious matching" provision. According to Paulsen, "these laws are constitu-
tional • • • because their purpose is to determine religious training with reference to 
a private rather than a governmental preference," thus avoiding the state action 
necessary to constitute an unconstitutional establishment of religion. Paulsen, Consti-
tutional Problems of Utilizing a Religious Factor in Adoptions and Placements of 
Children, in THE WALL BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE II7, 141 (D. Oaks ed. 1963). 
However, if a violation of constitutional rights is found, court enforcement of the 
contract may satisfy the state action requirement. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. l 
(1948). 
22. 216 App. Div. at 365, 215 N.Y.S. at 187. 
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not to form a contract.23 However, this is a factual issue that goes to 
the existence of a contract rather than to the problem of separation 
of church and state. Although, as noted by the appellate court in 
Wener,24 New York statutes and case law do not require a man to 
support a child not his own issue that he has not agreed to adopt, 
neither do they prohibit the assumption of that obligation by con-
tract. Such a contract benefits the child and should not be unenforce-
able as against public policy. 
I£ there had been a dispute within Judaism over the extent of the 
obligations imposed by Jewish law as they were referred to by the 
Wener ketuba, more complicated first amendment problems would 
have arisen, for the court may have been called upon to decide which 
of two or more interpretations to follow. This would certainly in-
volve some entanglement in religious affairs and may have the un-
constitutional effect of favoring one branch of the religion over 
another.25 
No such problem would arise where the matter has been pre-
viously ruled upon by a proper church tribunal, for secular courts 
must regard the decisions of a religious court on the correct meaning 
of a disputed religious doctrine as conclusive.26 
However, if the parties expect a secular court to resolve the dis-
pute, a serious constitutional problem does arise. In Presbyterian 
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian 
Church,21 the Supreme Court ruled that the first amendment pro-
hibits civil courts from resolving "controversies over religious doc-
trine and practice" even when a resolution is relevant to a suit, such 
as a property dispute, that is properly before the court.28 In Presby-
terian Church, two local churches and the general Presbyterian 
church, from which they had withdrawn in a dispute over doctrine, 
contested the ownership of property occupied by the local churches. 
Instead of utilizing internal church tribunals, the local churches 
sought to enjoin the general church from trespassing on the disputed 
23. See G. HOROWl'IZ, THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW 315-16 (1953). In some cases the 
ketuba may be written only in Aramaic. If neither party understood that language, it 
could be contended that the parties were unaware that they were signing a contract. 
24. 35 App. Div. 2d at 54, 312 N.Y.S.2d at 819. 
25. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952). 
26. Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. I (1929) (decision by the Archbishop of Manila 
that canon law prohibits petitioner from being appointed as chaplain must be accepted 
as conclusive by the secular court in the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness). 
The Gonzalez result was approved in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 
116 (1952), and Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian 
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447 (1969). See also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 
722·35 (1872). 
27. 393 U.S. 440 (1969) (Brennan, J.). 
28. 393 U.S. at 440. See also School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 
203, 243 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
1646 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:1641 
property. They argued that the property was theirs under Georgia 
common law, which implied "a trust of local church property for 
the benefit of the general church on the sole condition that the 
general church adhere to its tenets of faith and practice existing at 
the time of affiliation by the local churches."29 The plaintiffs alleged 
that the condition had failed. The Georgia supreme court affirmed 
a decision in favor of the local churches by a trial court that had al-
lowed a jury to determine "whether the actions of the general church 
'amount to fundamental or substantial abandonment of the original 
tenets and doctrines of the [general church].' "30 The Supreme Court 
reversed on first amendment grounds. 31 It felt that allowing secular 
courts to determine a matter "at the very core of a religion-the in-
terpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of 
those doctrines to the religion"32-might "[inhibit] the free develop-
ment of religious doctrine and [implicate] secular interests in matters 
of purely ecclesiastical concern.''88 The Court remanded, insisting 
that "the departure-from-doctrine element of Georgia's implied trust 
theory can play no role in any future judicial proceedings.''34 
Although it was not expressly enunciated by the Supreme Court 
until a year after Presbyterian Church,85 the entanglement doctrine 
requires the same result. In Lemon v. Kurtzman36 the Court held 
that governmental aid to parochial schools in the form of teachers' 
salaries was impermissible because it required continuing state sur-
veillance and control over religious institutions.87 The Court in 
Presbyterian Church seemed similarly concerned with the excessive 
state involvement that may arise in the course of interpreting church 
doctrines and assessing their relative significance.38 
However, the first amendment need not bar court enforcement 
of the Wener ketuba, even where there is some dispute over the 
Jewish law in question, for it is not clear that the Jewish law regard-
ing child support is "religion" within the meaning of the first 
amendment.39 
29. 393 U.S. at 442-43. 
30. 393 U.S. at 443-44. 
31. The Court's opinion never makes clear whether the impermissibility is based 
upon the establishment or the free exercise clause of the first amendment. See Kauper, 
Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969 
SUP. CT. R.Ev. 347, 374-76. 
32, 393 U.S. at 450. 
33. 393 U.S. at 449. 
34. 393 U.S. at 450 (emphasis original). 
35. See Walz v. Tax Commn., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). 
36. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
37. 403 U.S. at 619-20. 
38. 393 U.S. at 450. 
39. United States Supreme Court interpretations of the scope of "religion" in the 
context of the first amendment are ambiguous. The early view was that religion was 
primarily concerned with the relationship between man and God and the obliga-
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The term "Judaism" encompasses not only a "religion," but also 
a culture and a way of life that goes beyond primarily religious mat-
ters.40 Jewish law, consequently, is not composed solely of "religious 
law," but is essentially "racial, tribal, or national," as a New York 
court pointed out in S.S. & B. Live Poultry Corp. v. Kashruth Asso-
ciation.41 That court recognized that, although the entire system of 
Jewish law might be popularly termed "religious," it is more properly 
"divisible into two parts, one ... strictly religious, because concerned 
with the relations between man and God, the other essentially . . . 
secular, as controlling the relations be~v-een man and man."42 The 
first of these two divisions, which deals with such things as worship 
practices and dietary obligations, will here be called "theohuman"; 
the second, which includes, for example, marriage and kinship obli-
gations, will be called "interpersonal." 
The Jewish law of child support, and other Jewish interpersonal 
laws, may be termed "religious" only in the sense that traditional 
belief holds that God gave the entire law to Moses at Mount Sinai.43 
Thus, fulfillment of an interpersonal law would incidentally serve a 
religious end, in that it is believed to be in general accordance with 
God's will.44 This should not be sufficient to classify interpersonal 
tions owed by man to God. See, e.g., Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (Field, 
J.). Cf. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dis-
senting). Recent decisions have hinted at a broader interpretation. In United States v. 
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), the Court interpreted the Selective Service Act's require-
ment that one claiming conscientious objector status be opposed to all wars because 
of "religious training or belief." The Court concluded that to meet the Act's defini-
tion of religious belief-"an individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being 
involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including] 
essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or merely a personal moral 
code"-the objector must have a "sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in 
the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by • • • God" in the lives of 
persons clearly within the exemption. 380 U.S. at 176. Expressions by persons claiming 
conscientious objector status of, for example, a belief in "'some power manifest in 
nature ••• the supreme expression' that helps man in ordering his life" were found 
to meet the statutory definition. 380 U.S. at 188. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 206 
(1972), may have restricted the Seeger definition. In its general discussion of religion 
(the particular sect in question-the Amish-met any conceivable definition) the Court 
excluded beliefs that are "philosophical and personal." 406 U.S. at 216. Justice Douglas, 
in dissent, views this as a retreat from the Seeger definition. 406 U.S. at 247-48. It is 
submitted that acceptance for first amendment purposes of any such broad definition 
as that in Seeger would lead to absurd results. The Court in Seeger notes that to 
some, religion is found in "a way of life envisioning as its ultimate goal the day 
when all men can live together in perfect understanding and peace." 380 U.S. at 
174. Acceptance of this belief as religion could lead to a finding that the entire 
system of American law is a nontheistic religion, for the preamble to the Constitution 
states the purpose of that document in similar terms: "In Order to form a more 
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility ••• .'' 
40. See generally M. KAPLAN, JUDAISM AS A ClvruzATION (1934). 
41. 158 Misc. 358, 360, 285 N.Y.S. 879, 883 (Sup. Ct. 1936). 
42. 158 Misc. at 360, 285 N.Y.S. at 884. 
43. See Epstein, Introduction to Seder Nezikin, in BABYLONIAN TALMUD, pt. 4, 
v. 1, at xxxii (I. Epstein ed. 1935); s. BELKIN, IN His !MAGE 15-19 (1960). 
44. See Chavel, Foreword to MAIMONIDES, THE CoMMANDMENTS vii (C. Chavel ed. 
1967). 
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laws as "religious" within the meaning of the first amendment, for 
Jewish interpersonal law is in this respect strikingly similar to Anglo-
American law, much of which also is religious in origin and may in-
cidently serve religious goals.45 For example, in Dominus Rex & 
Tayler,46 Lord Hale expressed the view that "Christianity is part of 
the law itself" and a court may seek to redress injuries to God just as 
it may punish those who injure man. In the nineteenth century, 
several American courts echoed Hale's view in cases concerning 
such matters as Sunday closing laws,47 the validity of charities,48 and 
domestic relations.49 
Today, American courts would almost certainly reject Lord 
Hale's extreme view as violating the establishment clause.150 Mary-
45. Secular prohibitions against murder and theft, for instance, may satisfy the 
requirements and purposes of the ten commandments and yet not violate the es-
tablishment clause. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 462 (1961) (separate opinion 
of Frankfurter, J.). 
46. 84 Eng. Rep. 906 (K.B. 1675). 
47. Shover v. State, 10 Ark. 259 (1849). 
48. Vidal v. Girard's Exrs., 43 U.S. (2 How.) 126, 198-201 (1844); Field v. Drew 
Theological Seminary, 41 F. 371, 374 (C.C.D. Del. 1890). 
49. Goodrich v. Goodrich, 44 Ala. 670, 673-75 (1870). 
The widespread influence of religious doctrine on law is seen in the application 
of the common law definition of burglary. In general, burglary is confined to "the 
breaking and entering, in the nighttime, of the dwelling or mansion house of another, 
with intent to commit a felony therein." 13 AM. JUR. 2D, Burglary § I (1964). However, 
the dwelling house requirement did not apply to the burglary of churches. See 3 E. 
CoKE, INSilTUTES •64; McGraw v. State, 234 Md. 273, 199 A.2d 229 (1964), cert. denied, 
379 U.S. 862 (1964); Trevino v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 255, 254 S.W .2d 786 (1953). Lord 
Coke explained this curious exception by resorting to the religious belief that a church is 
the "dwelling house of God." E. CoKE, supra. For a modern court to predicate its con-
clusion of law on the religious belief that God dwells in a church would certainly violate 
the constitutional principle that the law may not "support any religious tenets." Davis 
v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890). Also it would contravene Justice Miller's exhortation 
that "the law ••• is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of 
no sect." Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872). In the words of the 
Hurwitz case, it would be enforcing religious dogma per se. 216 App. Div. at 365, 
215 N.Y.S. at 187. For a time, however, it seemed that Maryland, whose burglary 
statute, MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 29 (1971), permits prosecution for common law 
burglary, actually accepted Lord Coke's rationale. Thus, a trial judge's charge to the 
jury that mentioned Lord Coke's reason was held not to violate the Constitution. 
McGraw v. State, 234 Md. 273, 277-78, 199 A.2d 229, 231-32, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 
862 (1964). Further, an indictment that charged the defendants with attempting to 
burglarize "the dwelling house of God" was held to be sufficient, "though not in 
commendable form." Dortch v. State, I Md. App. 173, 175, 229 A.2d 148, 150 (Ct. 
Spec. App. 1967). Finally the Maryland courts rejected Lord Coke's rationale and 
simply concluded that churches are an exception to the dwelling house requirement. 
See Sizemore v. State, 10 Md. App. 682, 688, 272 A.2d 824, 827 (Ct. Spec. App. 1971). 
50. Thomas Jefferson was of the opinion that Hale's remark was erroneous. He 
traced Hale's view to earlier writers that, he felt, erroneously equated the use of 
the law of ecclesiastical courts with the use of the Bible itself. Jefferson, Whether 
Christianity Is a Part of the Common Law, Appendix. to VmGINIA REPORTS 137-42 
Gefferson 1829). But see State v. Chandler, 2 Harr. 555 (Del. 1837). 
Some nineteenth century American judges also criticized the view that Christianity 
is part of the common law. E.g., Bloom v. Richards, 2 Ohio 387, 391 (1853). In an 
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land, for example, has declared its blasphemy law unconstitutional 
on this basis.51 Nevertheless, the courts still recognize that religious 
beliefs are at the foundation of American society. Thus, Justice 
Douglas wrote, "[w]e are a religious people whose institutions pre-
suppose a Supreme Being,"52 and Judge Cardozo maintained that 
"public policy" is formed in part from society's religious values.53 
Moreover, as Justice Frankfurter pointed out in his separate opinion 
in McGowan v. Maryland: "State codes and the dictates of faith 
touch the same activities. Both aim at human good, and in their re-
spective views of what is good for man they may concur or they may 
conflict. No constitutional command which leaves religion free can 
avoid this quality of interplay."54 It would be erroneous, however, to 
characterize Anglo-American laws as "religious."55 Even when deal-
ing with laws that originally arose in a religious context-such as 
those against polygamy56 and Sunday labor57-the Supreme Court has 
recognized that the legislation primarily serves a secular purpose and 
is thus not subject to the first amendment's prohibitions. 
By analogy, those laws of Judaism, and possibly other religions, 
that deal with interpersonal relations have secular purposes and need 
not automatically be included in the first amendment category of 
"religion." When they are properly before the court-as when they 
are referred to in a contract, a trust, or an otherwise constitutional 
legislative enactment-the court should interpret them as part of its 
fact-finding process, even where there is some dispute as to their 
meaning.58 Although observance of the Jewish laws regarding, for 
interesting note in Swann v. Swann, 21 F. 299 (C.C.E.D. Ark. 1884), the court criticized 
Hill v. Wicker, 41 Ga. 449 (1871), which had based the restriction on Sunday labor 
upon the ten commandments. Contending that the Sabbath in the Bible refers to 
Saturday, not Sunday, the court remarked that the assumption to the contrary "il-
lustrates the danger of a civil court, which deals only with the temporal affairs of 
men, predicating a judgment on its interpretation of the Bible commands relating to 
spiritual affairs." 21 F. at 308. 
51. State v. West, 9 Md. App. 270, 263 A.2d 602 (Ct. Spec. App. 1970). 
52. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). 
53. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 72 (1921). 
54. 366 U.S. 420, 461-62 (1961). 
55. See Commonwealth ex rel. Brown v. Rundell, 424 Pa. 505, 227 A.2d 895, cert. 
denied, 387 U.S. 937 (1967). 
56. See Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). 
57. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), 
58. For example, the courts have granted Jewish cantors a tax exemption for par-
sonage allowances, deciding that they meet the statutory requirement of being 
"minister[s] of the gospel." Salkov v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 190 (1966); Silverman v. 
Commissioner, 57 T.C. 727 (1972), afjd., - F.2d - (8th Cir. 1973). In each case 
the court made its determination of the cantor's status in part on the basis of 
Jewish customary law. In Salkov the court noted that, while the rabbi alone can 
decide matters of Jewish law, the cantor's function is to be a "sheliach tzibbur" 
and "emissary of the congregation before the Almighty in prayer" and listed some of 
the cantor's sacerdotal functions at the Sabbath and at festivals, 46 T.C. at 196, 198. 
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instance, child support, bailments,59 debt,60 landlord-tenant rela-
tions,61 real property,62 labor relations,63 maritime cargo and charter 
agreements,64 and torts65 may, in a general sense, serve a religious 
purpose in that one following the law lives in accord with the will 
of God, the immediate effect and purpose of these laws is secular.66 
Thus, in Wener the first amendment need not have deterred the 
court from applying the Jewish law of child support if it was found 
to be required under a valid contract, even if there had been a dis-
pute as to its meaning. 
A secular court's resolution of a dispute over a Jewish interper-
sonal law may inhibit Jewish courts from resolving the matter differ-
ently in a subsequent case. However, if a dispute over an inter-
personal law is not a "religious" matter within the meaning of the 
first amendment, such a result would not be unconstitutional. 
Also, the secular resolution of a dispute over the meaning of an 
interpersonal law may have an indirect impact on the development 
of theohuman law, for in a complex body of laws a decision affecting 
one part may indirectly affect the others. 67 Although a direct impact 
on theohuman law would violate Presbyterian Church, a possible in-
Furthermore, in distinguishing a cantor from a Baptist minister of education, the 
tax court in Silverman indicated that the court was required to consider the "mores 
and customs" of each religion. 57 T.C. at 731. 
Similarly, a federal court has indicated that a cantor is entitled to an exemption 
from selective service as a clergyman. Application of Kanas, 385 F.2d 506, 509 (2d 
Cir. 1967). 
Judicial notice of religious beliefs is not uncommon. For example, reconciliation 
agreements between husband and wife, enforceable in court, frequently incorporate 
commonly held religious beliefs. One standard agreement takes notice that most people 
believe that a child is the "handiwork of God," not merely the parents' product, 
that God entrusts the parents with the child, and that the parents are God's agents 
in raising the child. Burke, Conciliation-A New Approach to the Divorce Problem, 
20 CAL. ST. B.J. 199, 211-12 (1955). See also State v. Olson, 287 Minn. 300, 178 N.W.2d 
230 (1970) (judicial notice of the solemnity of the Catholic mass); In re Estate of May, 
305 N.Y. 486, 114 N.E.2d 486 (1953) (finding that Jewish law permits marriage between 
an uncle and a niece). 
59. E.g., BABYLONIAN TALMUD, pt. 4, v. 2, Baba Mezia 93a-93b, at 537-40 (I. Epstein 
ed. 1935) [hereinafter BABYLONIAN TALMUD]. 
60. See 2 CODE OF MAIMONIDES, Creditor and Debtor 77-187 a. Oberman, L. Gins-
berg&: H. Wolfson ed. 1949) [hereinafter CODE OF MAIMONIDES]. 
61. See, e.g., THE MlsBNAH, Baba Metzia 8.6, at 361-62 (H. Danby ed. 1923). 
62. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 59, pt. 4, v. 3, Baba Bathra 28a, at 138. 
63. BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 59, pt. 4, v. 2, Baba Mezia 83a, at 476. 
64. CODE OF MAIMONIDES, supra note 60, Hiring ch. 5, §§ 3-4, at 19-20. 
65. See, e.g., BABYLONIAN TALMUD, supra note 59, pt. 4, v. 1, Baba Kamma 9a, at 36. 
66. See Epstein, supra note 42, at xxxiii. For example, the law of landlord-tenant 
relations deals with such secular matters as the notice required for the termination of 
leases (twelve months for commercial leases, one month for most residential leases of un-
specified terms). See THE MISHNAH, Baba Metzia 8.6, at 261-62 (H. Danby ed. 1933). 
See also L. FINKELSTEIN, THE PHARISEES (2d ed. 1962) (analysis of the social and 
economic role of the Jewish law in the early Talmudic period). 
67. See M. K.ADUSIDN, RABBINIC MIND 15 (1952). 
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direct future effect on a Jewish court's resolution of a theohuman 
matter seems remote and attenuated. Furthermore, any such effect 
would be neutralized by the Jewish court's awareness that its deci-
sions with respect to theohuman law will be conclusive in subsequent 
litigation before a secular court. 68 
Presbyterian Church, however, clearly forbids secular courts from 
resolving theohuman disputes directly. A civil court might be called 
upon to do this in, for example, a case involving the enforcement of 
a criminal statute relating to kosher foods. 69 Several states have such 
statutes, which provide for criminal penalties if a seller falsely repre-
sents food to be "kosher"70 or "prepared in accordance with Orthodox 
Hebrew religious requirements."71 
Even if there is no dispute over the meaning of the term "kosher" 
or the content of "Orthodox Hebrew religious requirements," the 
statutes themselves may be attacked as violating the first amendment 
on the grounds that their primary purpose and effect is to aid Jews 
in the observance of their religious rites.72 Although not establishing 
religion, enforcement of the statutes could be regarded as a forbidden 
step in that direction.73 However, these statutory provisions are more 
appropriately seen as merely enacted to enforce the general state 
policy against mislabeling and fraudulent misrepresentation in 
sales.74 They do not single out adherents of the Jewish religion for 
special protection. 15 
68. See text accompanying note 26 supra. 
69. Jewish kosher regulations are not merely a special way of preparing food. They 
relate primarily to a relationship between man and God, as do all ritual obligations. 
In contrast, court enforcement of a ketuba requires a husband to honor an interper• 
sonal commitment. 
70. E.g., D.C. CODE §§ 22-3404 to -3406 (1967). Cf. 21 C.F.R. § 3.202 (1973). 
71. N.Y. AGRIC. &: MKTS. LAW §§ 201(a)-(d) (McKinney 1972). See also CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 383(b) (West 1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 196-97 (1971); MAss. ANN. LAws 
§§ 94:156-57 (1967); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.297(e) (1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 31:651 (1963). 
72. But see People v. Goldberger, 163 N.Y.S. 663, 666 (N.Y. City Ct. Spec. Sess. 
1916). See also Sossin Sys., Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 262 S.2d 28, 30 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1972), in which the court upheld a kosher food ordinance against a first amend-
ment challenge. The court said that the ordinance was designed to safeguard the free 
exercise of Jews in the practice of their religion. 
73. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
74. E.g., N.Y. AGIUC. &: MKTS. I.Aw § 201 (McKinney 1972). The specific secular 
reasons for enacting kosher food laws include the protection of buyers who expect a 
higher standard of cleanliness in kosher food, People v. Atlas, 183 App. Div. 595, 596, 
170 N.Y.S. 834, 836 (1918), and the prevention of the fraudulent sale of less expensive 
nonkosher food at higher kosher prices. People v. Gordon, 172 Misc. 543, 545, 14 
N.Y.S.2d 333, 335 (N.Y. City Ct. Spec. Sess. 1939), revd. on other grounds, 258 App. 
Div. 421, 16 N.Y.S.2d 833, afjd. mem., 283 N.Y. 707, 28 N.E.2d 717 (1940). 
75. In New York, for example, the general mislabeling statute provides a more 
severe penalty than does the specific kosher labeling law. Compare N.Y. Acruc. &: MKTS, 
LAW § 201 (McKinney 1972); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 55.10, 70.15, 80.05 (McKinney 1972); 
N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 392(b) (McKinney 1972) (misbranding generally-one year or 
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Generally, the interpretation of the terms "kosher" or "Orthodox 
Hebrew religious requirements" will pose no problem. For example, 
in a 1925 suit challenging these terms as too indefinite to provide the 
seller with adequate notice of what is allowed and what is prohibited, 
the Supreme Court pointed out that the term "kosher" is generally 
understood and that any possible uncertainty is not unlike similar 
difficulties encountered in other criminal statutes.76 
However, if a dispute did arise concerning the meaning of these 
terms, arl attempted judicial resolution of the controversy may be 
prohibited by Presbyterian Church because of the theohuman nature 
of the dispute.77 
It could be argued that such a judicial determination is, like pro-
viding police and fire protection to synagogues, necessary to safeguard 
the Jews' free exercise of religion. 78 This consideration did not deter 
the Court in Presbyterian Church, where one effect of the Georgia 
court's decision, reversed by the Supreme Court, was to protect the 
local church in the observance of its religious beliefs and practices. 
However, since there was a dispute between two segments of the 
church, the over-all effect of protecting the local churches in this way 
was to inhibit the general church in the free development of its 
religious doctrine. Similarly, a resolution of a theohuman dispute by 
a secular court should not be permitted. 
The inability of secular courts to resolve controversies over 
Jewish theohuman law should not render the kosher statutes uncon-
stitutional. As pointed out above, 79 it is unlikely that the general re-
quirements of the Jewish dietary laws will be disputed. Also, if a 
showing of specific intent to defraud is required, 80 a bona fide belief 
that the food is kosher will excuse the seller and render a judicial 
determination of the meaning of the term unnecessary. 
1000 dollars) with N.Y. Acruc. & MKTS. LAW§ 20l(d) {McKinney 1972) (kosher labeling-
one year or 500 dollars). See also People v. Atlas, 183 App. Div. 595, 170 N.Y.S. 834 
(1918). 
76. Hygrade Provisions Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925). See also People v. Atlas, 
183 App. Div. 595, 170 N.Y.S. 834 (1918); Ehrlich v. Municipal Ct, 55 Cal. 2d 552, 360 
P.2d 334, 11 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1961). 
77. The diverse sources of Jewish law make such disputes with respect to specific 
applications of the dietary laws possible. See note 2 supra. Cf. Tamarkin v. Children 
of Israel, Inc., 2 Ohio App. 60, 206 N.E.2d 412 (1965), appeal dismissed, 384 U.S. 157 
(1966) (disagreement over Jewish law regarding disinterment of bodies). 
78. See People v. Goldberger, 163 N.Y.S. 663, 665 (N.Y. City Ct. Spec. Sess. 1916); 
Sossin Sys., Inc., v. City of Miami Beach, 262 S.2d 28, 30 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1972). 
A similar rationale has been used to uphold statutes prohibiting the disruption of 
religious services. Ford v. State, 210 Tenn. 105, 110, 355 S.W.2d 102, 103-04, rehearing 
denied, 210 Tenn. 105, 356 S.W .2d 726 (1962), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 994 (1964). 
79. See text accompanying note 76 supra. 
80. See Hygrade Provisions Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 502-03 (1925), construing 
New York statutes, chs. 580-81 [1922] N.Y. Laws 1314, substantially like the present 
New York law, N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS, LAW§ 20l(a) {McKinney 1972). 
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An accused seller may attempt to halt the prosecution by raising 
a frivolous claim that the product he is selling is kosher. For ex-
ample, the seller of a "kosher cheeseburger" might claim that it 
meets the Jewish dietary requirements. A court might think itself 
bound by Presbyterian Church to dismiss the charge, for the court 
must make at least a cursory investigation of Jewish law to determine 
that mixtures of meat and dairy products are unkosher. However, 
since in such a case there is no real dispute between different seg-
ments of the religion, a court would not be promoting one branch 
and inhibiting another. Moreover, no "excessive" entanglement of 
church and state need be involved, for a superficial reading of the 
Jewish law would be sufficient to dispose of the claim. 
It should be noted that determining whether or not a given mat-
ter is theohuman or interpersonal might itself involve the court in 
some entanglement in religious matters. Certain laws clearly fall into 
one category or the other,81 but the classification of others may re-
quire closer analysis of their history and purpose. However, this 
analysis is thrust upon the courts by the first amendment itself. As 
Chief Justice Burger has said: "No perfect or absolute separation is 
really possible; the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an in-
volvement of sorts-one that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid ex-
cessive entanglement."82 
81. See note 66 supra; text accompanying notes 56-66 supra. 
82. Walz v. Tax Commn., 387 U.S. 664, 670 (1970). 
